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Abstract 
We show that the axiomatization given by Levesque for his logic of “only knowing” [ 21, which 
he showed to be sound and complete for the unquantified version of the logic and conjectured to 
be complete for the full logic, is in fact incomplete. 
1. Introduction 
Levesque [ 21 introduced a first-order modal ogic OC with a modal operator for “only 
knowing”, which was taken to be the conjunction of “knowing at least” and “knowing 
at most”. ’ He provided a collection of axioms for this logic which he showed were 
sound and complete in the unquantified case. He conjectured that the axiomatization 
was complete for the full logic. As we show here, it is not. 
In the next section of this note we review the syntax and semantics of OC, and 
Levesque’s axiomatization of it. In Section 3, we show that Levesque’s axiomatization 
is incomplete. We conclude in Section 4 with some further discussion of the problem 
of axiomatizing OC. 
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2. A review of OL 
We briefly review enough of CX here to make this paper self-contained. The reader 
is encouraged to consult [2] for further details and intuition. 
The non-modal part of C?C consists of a standard first-order logic with = and a 
countably infinite set of standard names, which are treated syntactically like constants, 
but have a special semantics (see below). There are neither regular constants nor 
function symbols. This base language is extended by two modal operators, B and N, 
where Bcu can be read as “the agent believes (at least) CY” and NCY can be read as “the 
agent believes at most that LY is false”. Oa is taken to be an abbreviation of La A NXY. 
An atomic formula is a predicate other than =, applied to standard names. The formula 
(Y[ x/n] denotes (Y with all occurrences of the free variable x replaced by n. A formula 
is said to be basic if it does not involve the N (or 0) operator, objective if it does not 
involve any modal operators, and subjective if all predicate symbols occur within the 
scope of a modal operator. 
The semantics is based on the notion of possible worlds, where a world is an interpre- 
tation of the predicate symbols over the domain consisting of the standard names. Thus, 
the standard names are rigid designators, denoting the same element of the domain, 
namely themselves, in every world. A world w can be identified with the set of atomic 
formulas that are true at w (using the standard semantics of first-order logic). We call 
the set of all worlds WO. Belief (B) is modeled in a standard possible-world fashion in 
terms of a set W of worlds. The beliefs of the agent are those sentences that are true 
in all worlds of W. It is well known that this simple model of belief yields the modal 
logic K4.5, that is, beliefs are closed under logical consequence and positive as well as 
negative introspection. As we said, given a set W of worlds, B denotes truth in all the 
worlds of W. N, on the other hand, denotes truth in all worlds not in W, that is, all the 
worlds in WO - W. By itself, N is just another ordinary belief operator like B. However, 
as we shall see later, the interaction between B and N turns out to be surprisingly subtle. 
Given a pair W; w, which we call a situation, an arbitrary sentence of C?! is interpreted 
according to the following recursive rules. 
W, w + p if p E w, where p is an atomic formula, 
K w k (n = m) if n and m are identical standard names, 
Kwb7aifKwpa, 
~w~=V/3ifW,w~=oorWTw+/l, 
W, w b 3xa if K w b CY[.X/~] for some standard name n, 
W w + Ba if for all w’ E W, W, w’ b a, 
W; w b Na if for all w’ $Z W, W, w’ b a. 
Since the semantics of a subjective sentence u for a given situation W, w does not depend 
on w, we often write W f= cr instead of u! w /= (+ in this case. Analogously, we write 
w b LY instead of w w + LY for objective (Y. 
Actually, the semantics we have just described is not quite Levesque’s semantics. 
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Rather than allowing W to be an arbitrary set of worlds, Levesque requires that W be 
maximal in a sense we now describe. 
Two sets of worlds are said to be equivalent if they represent the same set of basic 
beliefs. More precisely, we say that sets W and W’ are equivalent if for every basic 
formula LY, we have W ,b Ba iff W’ k Ba. Levesque shows that there is a unique way 
to extend each set of worlds to a largest set which is equivalent to it. These largest sets 
of worlds are called maximal sets. For technical reasons, Levesque uses only maximal 
sets in his semantics for OL. Thus, Levesque defines a formula (Y to be valid if W; w k LT 
for all situations uch that W is maximal. 
We also use Levesque’s version of validity, but notice that his definitions make perfect 
sense even if we do not restrict to maximal sets. We define a formula cy to be strongly 
valid if K w k a for all situations W; w (including ones where W is non-maximal). 
Clearly a formula that is strongly valid must be valid. It follows immediately from the 
definition of maximality that validity and strong validity coincide if we restrict o basic 
formulas. On the other hand, there may be non-basic formulas that are valid but not 
strongly valid. 
We next review Levesque’s axiomatization. 
The axiom system AX 
Let L stand for both B and N. 
Axioms. 
Al. All instances of theorems of first-order logic. 
A2. Lcr, where LY is an instance of a theorem of first-order logic. 
A3. (ni = ni) A (ni # nj), where ni and nj are distinct standard names. 
A4. L(cu + ,f3) + (LCY =+ Lp). 
AS. VxLa =s- LVxcu. 
A6. ff =S La, if (+ is a subjective sentence. 
A7. No + ~BcY, if (Y is a falsifiable objective sentence. 
Inference rules. 
MI? From (Y and LY + /3 infer p. 
UG. From cy [x/n, ] , . . . , a [ x/nk] infer VXCY, where the ni range over all standard names 
in LY and one not in a. 
Levesque showed that AX is sound with respect to his notion of validity, where 
only maximal sets of worlds are considered, and complete with respect o unquantified 
sentences, o that any valid sentence without quantifiers is provable from these axioms. 
It is easy to see that AX is also sound with respect o strong validity, where we allow 
arbitrary sets of worlds. 
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3. Incompleteness of the axiom system 
In this section we prove that Levesque’s axiom system is incomplete with respect to 
the full language. In fact, we show that there is a formula that is strongly valid that is 
not provable in his system. 
Consider the two sets WI and W2 defined in the proof of [2, Theorem 3.61. WI 
consists of all worlds in which at least the odd-numbered standard names satisfy P, and 
let W2 = WI - {wg}, w h ere wg is the world where the standard names that satisfy P are 
precisely the odd-numbered standard names. It is easy to check that the only standard 
names believed to satisfy P in both W1 and W2 are the odd-numbered names, that is, 
Wj /= B(P(n,)) iff i is odd, for j = 1,2. 
Levesque shows 
Lemma 3.1 ( [ 21, Lemma 3.6.2). For any objective formula cr, we have WI k BLY iff 
W, t= Bcu. 
We next define a slightly nonstandard notion of satisfaction kNS. Actually, kNS agrees 
with k except on situations of the form W2, w. Formally, all clauses in the definition of 
k Ns are identical to the corresponding clause in the definition of k, except for formulas 
of the form Na if we are considering the set WT. In this case, we define: 
W2, w kt.,s NCY iff W2, w’ kNS cy for all w’ $ WI. 
Notice that for k, the corresponding definition would have as its last clause “for all 
w’ @ W2”. In particular this means we do not consider the world we when evaluating 
the truth of Ncz in W2 according to kNs. 
Lemma 3.2. For all objective formulas CY, we have W1 b=NS NCI iff W2 bNS NCL 
Proof. This is immediate from the definitions, since in both cases, to evaluate the truth 
of NCY, we consider the worlds not in WI. 0 
Lemma 3.3. Everything provable from AX is strongly valid with respect to bNS. 
Proof. We must check that all the axioms of AX are strongly valid with respect to 
!= NS and that all the rules of inference preserve strong validity with respect to kNS. 
The result then follows by a straightforward induction on the length of the proof. All 
the cases are completely straightforward except possibly Axiom A7. Since b and kNS 
agree on all sets of worlds except possibly W2, we must only check that this axiom 
holds in W2. 
Suppose that for some falsifiable objective formula LY, we have W;! kNs Ncz A Ba. By 
Lemma 3.2, we have that WI kNS NCY. Since &S and k agree with respect to WI, we 
must have WI k Ncr. Since bNS and /= agree with respect to formulas of the form Ba 
where (Y is objective, we must also have W2 + Ba. By Lemma 3.1, we have WI k Bcu. 
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Thus, WI + Ba A Na. But this contradicts the strong validity of Axiom A7 with respect 
tab. cl 
Our goal is now to construct a formula that is strongly valid with respect o + but 
not with respect o kNS. By Lemma 3.3, such a formula cannot be provable from AX, 
thus showing that AX is incomplete. 
Let +I be the sentence 3x(P(x) AlBP(x)) and let 142 be the sentence 3x(+(x) A 
BP(x) ) . 2 Thus, $1 is true if there is a standard name satisfying P that is not one of 
the standard names believed to satisfy P; 942 is true if there is a standard name satisfying 
TP which is one of the standard names believed to satisfy P. Let + = 91 V 1,b2. Notice 
that $ is true at every world with respect o WI or W2 except wo, the world where the 
standard names that satisfy P are precisely those believed to satisfy P. Thus, 
(I) 
Since + does not mention N, it is easy to see that ( 1) also holds if we replace k by 
t= NS’ 
Lemma 3.4. NI) =s -Be is strongly valid (with respect o b). 
Proof. Suppose W b N$. Let A = {n : n is a standard name and W b BP(n)} and let 
w be a world such that w k P(n) iff n E A. It is easy to see that W, w k -$. Since 
W + N$, it must be the case that w E W. Thus, W + ~Bqb. This proves the strong 
validity of Nt+G =+ yB#. (Notice that this does not follow from Axiom A7, since + 
is not an objective formula, although the proof of its validity follows along the same 
general ines as the corresponding proof for objective formulas.) 0 
The following lemma shows that, although it is valid with respect o k, N+ + ~BI/J 
is not valid with respect o hs: 
Lemma 3.5. WZ bNS N+ A Be. 
Proof. This follows from observation (1) above, which says that + is satisfied (with 
respect o + or kNS) by every world except WO. However, we do not consider wo for 
either B (since wo $! W2) or N (because of our nonstandard semantics). 0 
Thus, there is a formula that is strongly valid (with respect o b) that is not provable, 
namely N$ + B$. We conclude, as desired, that: 
Theorem 3.6. AX is not a complete axiomutization for OL. 
* These sentences were used (for a different purpose) in [ 11. 
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4. Discussion 
Having shown that Levesque’s axiomatization is incomplete, the question remains 
what a complete axiomatization would look like. 
Typically, we expect an axiomatization to be recursive. As Levesque already noted, 
his axiom system is not recursive. In particular, A7 is not recursive, since it involves 
checking whether a formula is first-order formula is falsifiable, which is known to be a 
co-r.e. problem (see [ 31). This is not an artifact of Levesque’s framework. It is easy to 
show that there cannot be a recursive complete axiomatization of CE, since the validity 
problem for the language is not r.e. 
Lemma 4.1. Every complete axiomatization of OL is non-recursive. 
Proof. Suppose there were a recursive complete axiomatization AX’ of C!C. Then the 
set of falsifiable objective formulas would be r.e., since we could generate them by 
generating all the objective formulas CY such that Ncu + 7Ba is provable from AX’. 
Since the set of falsifiable objective formulas is co-r.e., this is a contradiction. 0 
If we are willing to give up recursiveness, then finding a non-recursive axiomatization 
is, in a sense, trivial: simply declare every valid sentence an axiom. Of course, for an 
axiomatization to be instructive, it should not have to appeal to the very notion which 
it tries to capture. We would hope that the axioms would be “natural”, and give insight 
into the logic. 
We do not know whether there is a “natural” proof-theoretic account of the logic 
(whatever that may mean), but, as the following results suggest, if there is one, it will 
be hard to find. 
Recall that our incompleteness proof proceeds by showing that, for a particular basic 
formula $, the formula N+ =+ lB1+5 is strongly valid yet not provable from the axioms. 
The latter formula almost looks like an instance of Axiom A7. It is not, of course, since 
A7 would apply only if the formula $ were objective. The obvious idea, namely to 
strengthen axiom schema A7 by allowing it to range over all falsifiable basic sentences, 
can easily be dismissed. For example, consider the subjective sentence BP(n) for some 
predicate P and standard name n. BP(n) is obviously falsifiable, yet NBP( n) + 
TBBP( n) is not valid. In fact, NBP (n) = BBP( n) is easily derivable from the axioms 
(using A6) and is therefore valid. 
But what about basic sentences that are not subjective like the sentence 1/1 used in the 
previous section? In other words, do we obtain a complete axiomatization if we replace 
Axiom A7 by the following Axiom A7’? 
A7’. Na + ABLY, if LY is a falsifiable basic non-subjective sentence. 
Since 9 is basic, non-subjective, and falsifiable, the offending sentence N$ + TBIC, 
would now come out trivially as a theorem. Unfortunately, A7’ does not solve the 
problem either, since restricting the axiom schema to non-subjective basic sentences is 
still unsound. To see this, consider the formula 
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cp =Vx(P(x) * BP(x)), 
which is obviously falsifiable. However, 
Lemma 4.2. Nsp =+ ~Bcp is not valid. 
Proof. Let Wp consist of all worlds w such that w + VxP( x). Clearly Wp is maximal. 
For suppose W and Wp are equivalent. Then, in particular, W b B(VxP( x) ), so we 
must have W C Wp. We next show that Wp k Bcp A Np. It is easy to see that 
Wp,w b B(‘v’xP(x)) =s p for all worlds w. Since Wp k B(VxP(x)), it follows that 
Wp, w + ye for all worlds w. This means that Wp k Bp A Np. Hence Nqo + ‘Bp is 
not valid (and, afortiori, not strongly valid). 0 
Although, as we just showed, Np + ‘Bp is not valid, there is a sense in which it 
just misses being valid. As we now show, the only time it fails to be valid is when every 
standard name is known not to satisfy P (as was the case for the set Wp of worlds 
considered in Lemma 4.2). 
Lemma 4.3. -IB(VXP(X)) + (Np + 1Bp) is strongly valid. 
Proof. Let W be any set of worlds such that W b lB(VxP( x) ) A Nqp. Since W k 
1B(VxP(x)), there is a standard name PI* such that W k 7BP(n*). Since W + Nqo, 
it follows that for all w’ $! W, we have W; w’ k Vx( P(x) + BP(x) ). In particular, 
this means that for all w’ 4 W, we must have w’ + -P(n*). Thus, there must be some 
w E W such that w b P( n* ) . Clearly K w b 140, so W k lBq, as desired. 0 
These lemmas show that finding a relatively natural extension of Axiom A7 that 
would cover the counterexample is a subtle matter. Nor is there any guarantee that such 
an extension would give us a complete axiomatization. For example, notice that all the 
sound axioms we have considered so far are not only valid, but strongly valid. It may 
well be that there are formulas that are valid but not strongly valid. If so, we need to 
find an axiom that is valid but not strongly valid. The formulas that we have considered 
in this paper do not have this property. We leave further exploration of these issues to 
future work. 
References 
[ l] H.J. Levesque, Foundations of a functional approach to knowledge representation, Artif Intell. 23 (1984) 
155-212. 
[2] H.J. Levesque, All I know: A study in autoepistemic logic, Artif: Intell. 42 (3) (1990) 263-309. 
[ 31 H. Rogers Jr., Theory of Recursive Functions and Efective Computability (McGraw-Hill, New York, 
1967). 
